The dematerialization of telecommunication: communication centres and peripheries in Europe and the world, 1850–1920 by Wenzlhuemer, Roland
The dematerialization of
telecommunication:
communication centres and
peripheries in Europe and
the world, 1850–1920
Roland Wenzlhuemer
Centre for British Studies, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Germany
E-mail: roland.wenzlhuemer@staff.hu-berlin.de
Abstract
Interregional communication has been a key constituent of the process of globalization since
its very origins. For most of its history, information has moved between world regions and
along the routes according to the rationales established by interregional trade and migration.
The dematerialization of telecommunication in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century
eventually detached long-distance information transmission from transport and transformed
the global communication structure. New communication centres (and new peripheries)
emerged. Some regions moved closer to the global data stream than others. It is still unclear
how such different degrees of global connectivity impacted on local development. This essay
contributes to the identification and valuation of global communication centres and periph-
eries in order to provide suitable candidates for future case studies. To this end, statistical
data on the development of domestic telegraph networks in selected countries has been ana-
lysed and interpreted. In a second step, Social Network Analysis methods have been employed
to measure the centrality of almost three hundred cities and towns in the European telecom-
munication network of the early twentieth century.
‘You cannot not communicate.’
Paul Watzlawick
Introduction
Globalization is all about world regions being in touch with each other. Although this might
seem to be a mere truism, the simple statement’s avail lies in clearly identifying two of the
global historian’s foremost objects of study: global connections and interactions. Waves of
globalization therefore are nothing but the creation of new connections between hitherto
isolated regions or the intensification of existing links, while de-globalization – taking place,
for instance, in the interwar period of the twentieth century – is the consequence (or indeed
the act) of diminishing contact and exchange. The reasons for both intensification and
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decrease are manifold and can relate to political, economic, social or cultural factors.
Periods of intensification, however, often also go along with technological advances in
transport and/or communication which render the negotiation of large distances easier.
Such advances may come in two categories: as increases in quantity or as thorough changes
in quality. In the nineteenth century, the invention and diffusion of the railway is an
example for the former. Ever bigger loads of goods and higher numbers of passengers could
now be transported across England and the industrializing world. Both speed and capacity
of the railways outperformed horse carts and coaches, but apart from that the physical nat-
ure of transport changed but little. The invention and spread of electric telegraphy on the
other hand belongs to the latter category. It marks one of the rare moments when technol-
ogical progress impacts not only on capacities and speed, but also on the very nature of a
process – in our case of telecommunication.
Connections are established by movements – either of people (migration), goods (trade)
or information (communication). Although these three elements often move together (the
merchant caravan providing one of the more picturesque examples), their impact on sending
and receiving countries is mostly studied separately. The study of migration and migratory
movements has long been a central concern of historians who employ a global perspective.1
And the study of supra-regional, intercontinental and finally global trade and trade patterns
has also seen a good deal of scholarly attention.2 The role of information movement, how-
ever, has received little recognition by global historians so far.3 This can partly be explained
by the fact that for the better part of human history, information generally moved with peo-
ple. The diffusion of inventions, ideas or intelligence has received some scholarly thought,4
but has generally been closely attached to the study of migration or trade. The flow of infor-
mation comes as an unavoidable by-product of the flow of people and material goods and is
often studied accordingly.
Especially for the period before the nineteenth century, this approach certainly holds
much value, but does not allow for the dynamics of information flow itself. Even at the
time when migrants and traders served as the main vehicles of information movement, com-
munication obeyed its own rationale and did not stick strictly to the routes, speed or inten-
tions of its carriers. At times, it outpaced its conveyors or lagged behind. Contents and
meanings might change while in transit. Sometimes the spread of information (or knowledge
1 See, for instance, the bibliography in Adam McKeown, ‘Global migration, 1846–1940’, Journal of World
History, 15, 2, 2004, pp. 155–90.
2 E.g. Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, eds., The world that trade created: culture, society and the
world economy, 1400 to the present, London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999; Kenneth Pomeranz, The great
divergence: China, Europe and the making of the modern world economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000; Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: global economy in the Asian age, Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1998.
3 Some notable exceptions: Daniel Headrick, The invisible weapon: telecommunications and international
politics, 1851–1945, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991; Peter Hugill, Global communications
since 1844, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999; Jill Hills, The struggle for control of
global communication: the formative century, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2002; Peter
McMahon, Global control: information technology and globalization since 1845, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2002.
4 E.g. Philip Curtin, Cross-cultural trade in world history, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984;
Joel Mokyr, The gifts of Athena: historical origins of the knowledge economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2002.
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as a processed form of information) would peter out for no obvious reason; other bits and
pieces would spread like wildfire. All this is to say that even at a time when information
moved with and through people and goods, its movement, reception and impact deserve
separate attention and some detachment from the study of migration and trade.5 With the
technological developments of the late eighteenth and then the nineteenth century, however,
such separate treatment becomes a necessity. The advent of telecommunication detached the
flow of information from the movement of people. This marks a watershed in the history of
globalization, because it created a new, virtual space in which established distances and lim-
itations of time were suspended. The quality of global communication was completely
altered by its dematerialization.
But what exactly are the qualitative changes ushered in by the dematerialization of tele-
communication and how are these connected to patterns of global interaction? The emergence
and early spread of electric telegraphy – first domestically and then internationally – falls into
a time of constantly intensifying global trade links and an increasing volume of international
trade. The industrial revolution provided the industrializing countries in Europe and North
America with new transport technologies. Iron-clad and steam-driven ships started to ply
inland waterways and coastal areas in the 1820s and subsequently conquered the high seas.
On land, the expansion of the railway network significantly cut transport costs. In his excel-
lent study on the acceleration of international communication between 1820 and 1870, Yrjo¨
Kaukiainen has convincingly argued that – together with other factors – these technological
advances have significantly reduced communication times between world regions during his
period of observation. In purely quantitative terms, the ‘shrinking of the world’ in this pre-
telegraphic period is even more pronounced than the advances made through the spread of
global telegraphy in later years as Kaukiainen aptly demonstrates.6
Highly significant as these early increases in transmission speed certainly are, they do lack
one essential quality that comes only with the detachment of information transmission from
transport. ‘[Information] moved along with the cargo, and though not usually bulky, its speed
was limited to that of the fastest mode of travel of the day.’7 Therefore, before the emergence
of a global telegraph network, information could not outpace railways or steamships. For
instance, merchant houses had no means to control their ships or provide them with up-
to-date market information once they had left the home port. Birgitte Holten as well as Byron
Lew and Bruce Cater have recently drawn our attention to the qualitative changes in global
trade and trade patterns brought about by international telegraphy. Holten compares three
examples of trade transactions between European or North American merchant houses and
Brazilian coffee exporters as to their organization and efficiency. She shows that before South
America was telegraphically linked with the rest of the world, trade transactions depended on
pre-arranged instructions. For the merchant houses it was impossible to react flexibly on
changing conditions. The second transaction discussed by Holten took place in 1874, shortly
5 See, for instance, Oystein S. LaBianca and Sandra A. Scham, eds., Connectivity in antiquity: globalization
as a long-term historical process, London: Equinox, 2006.
6 Yrjo¨ Kaukiainen, ‘Shrinking the world: improvements in the speed of information transmission, c. 1820–
1870’, European Review of Economic History, 5, 1, 2001, pp. 1–28.
7 Byron Lew and Bruce Cater, ‘The telegraph, co-ordination of tramp shipping, and growth in world trade,
1870–1910’, European Review of Economic History, 10, 2, 2006, p. 147.
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before South America was directly connected to the global telegraph network but with
well-developed domestic networks in place in Europe and North America. Although the head-
quarters’ control over their ships had improved only marginally compared to the earlier
example, it becomes clear that general information on world markets and business conduct
was significantly more widely available and easier to access. The final example from 1893 –
with a reasonably tight global telegraph network up and running – clearly highlights how
international business methods had changed during the period of observation. Market inform-
ation was exchanged by telegraph and readily available at both ends of the transaction. Coffee
orders were handled more promptly and more flexibly, thereby making the trade significantly
more cost-effective.8
Byron Lew and Bruce Cater have tried to quantitatively assess the impact of this quali-
tative transformation of global trade methods so aptly described by Birgitte Holten. In a
recent article they show that the global spread of telegraphy – and with it the change in ship-
ping co-ordination – has had a highly stimulating impact on the growth of world trade
between 1870 and 1910. With the help of refined quantitative methods they prove the close
connection between the telegraphic development of a region and its position in global trade.
In a counterfactual analysis, Lew and Cater argue that international trade in the year 1870
would have been twice as voluminous as it actually was, had the telegraphic network of that
year already had the dimensions of the year 1910.9 While, at least to my understanding, the
historical validity of such calculations still stands on somewhat disputable ground (despite
the sophisticated statistical methods involved), it is nevertheless convincingly argued that
domestic as well as international telegraphic development intensified global trade links
and transformed established trade patterns in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Global connectivity became a key factor in determining a country’s or a region’s position
in international trade during that time. Therefore, if we want to fully understand the global
trade patterns and structures, we have to be aware of the distribution of global communica-
tion centres and peripheries in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. It is the central
aim of this essay to contribute to an identification of such centres and peripheries. After a
definition of the terms ‘dematerialization’ and ‘telecommunication’, which I deem necessary
in order to exactly frame the subject of study, the article provides a short introduction to the
technical history of telegraphy. In the following sections, quantitative data on the growth of
domestic telegraph networks in European and non-European countries will be presented
and interpreted. This data will confirm that – together with North America – Europe
undoubtedly stood at the centre of the global telecommunication network. With the help
of Social Network Analysis methods, I will then take a closer look at the European network
and try to pin down the significantly different positions that individual cities and regions
occupied in this network. Hopefully, I will be able to show that even within a telegra-
phically relatively well developed world region like Europe, global connectivity was very
unevenly distributed and came in a number of different grades and qualities. While an ideal
network analysis would draw on data from the entire global telecommunication network,
this is unfortunately not possible due to the scarcity of data on telegraph circuits outside
8 Birgitte Holten, ‘Telegraphy and business methods in the late 19th century’, unpublished paper for
‘Cross-Connexions’ conference, London, 11–13 November 2005.
9 Lew and Cater, ‘Co-ordination of tramp shipping’, p. 161.
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the so-called Western world. Therefore, the network analysis is limited to European data,
but I will make reference to its position in and connectivity with the global network wher-
ever possible.
Defining dematerialization
I have repeatedly been made aware of the various terminological and semantic difficulties
arising from the use of the word ‘dematerialization’. Neither from a purely philosophical
nor from a natural scientific viewpoint is the use of the term sufficiently exact as it implies
the complete escape from the realm of matter as such. This, however, is not how the word
will be used here. Neither does it refer to the philosophical concept of materialism, nor does
it want to withstand scrutiny from post-Newtonian physicists. I use the term for the very
reasons for which we still employ Newtonian physical laws and calculations in everyday
life: because it is exact and yet simple enough to describe what happened to information
transmission from the viewpoint of a social historian. What exactly has changed in the
way we send and receive messages and how did this impact on societies? Dematerialization
is exact and complex enough to provide a number of valuable clues in this direction. It
stands for the translation of information into acoustic, optical or – most importantly – elec-
tric impulses instead of using tangible (i.e. material) carriers. That telegraph lines, for
instance, are quite tangible, too, does not oppose this definition as the line (or the cable)
itself, once put in place, does not move in order to convey a message but merely provides
the path along which information travels. In this respect the telegraph line is to communica-
tion what roads or railway tracks are to transport: not the message, only the medium.10
Technically, dematerialization merely frees information transmission from a number of
(Newtonian) physical constraints from which all material movement suffers. Dematerialized
information does not have a mass (if we ignore the infinitesimal mass of moving electrons
for now). It is thus not limited by physical inertia (whereas technological inertia is yet
another matter, as will be seen below). Some sorts of non-material communication know
other limitations. The spoken or shouted word only reaches so far. Leaving aside fibre
optics, optical communication depends on a clear line of sight. Electric current needs a
wire and encounters electrical resistance. Yet, all these limitations follow rationales different
from those faced by moving matter.
The earliest and still essential forms of communication between humans were non-
material: sounds, signs, and speech. Later, both the visual and the verbal forms of informa-
tion sharing became materialized and developed, for instance, into painting and eventually
script.11 The transmission of reasonably complex information over larger stretches of time
(storage) and space depended on such materialization.12 Ancient means of dematerialized
10 Marshall McLuhan’s influential thoughts on how the medium can indeed become the message in mass
communication probably do not apply in this particular case. Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The
medium is the massage: an inventory of effects, New York: Bantam Books, 1967.
11 I owe this valuable insight to David Christian who has pointed out to me that human communication
first had to go through materialization before it could eventually be dematerialized again.
12 Although prone to changes in content and meaning, oral tradition might constitute an exception in
information transmission over time.
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distance communication – such as fire beacons, drums or smoke signals – were inflexible
and suitable for simple, prearranged messages only. While pioneering the principle of demat-
erialization, they existed in a narrow niche and cannot be considered an alternative to mater-
ial distance communication.
Only the invention and diffusion of telecommunication technologies in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century finally rendered the dematerialization of complex long-distance
communication possible and completely changed its nature. By detaching communication
from transport, a virtual space was created that adhered to a set of alternative physical and
psychological rules. I have argued and illustrated elsewhere that in this virtual information
space the relation between time and space is distorted.13 Complex messages based on flexible
code systems negotiated large distances with the use of very little time and energy. While their
relation was still proportional, the ratio between the covered distance and the duration of
the transmission had shifted enormously. Telecommunication had freed itself from the speed
limits of material transport.
Telecommunication
The word ‘telecommunication’ was coined by Edouard Estaunie´ (1862–1942) in his Traite´
pratique de te´le´communication electrique published in the year 1904. Putting the Greek tele
for ‘distant’ in front of ‘communication’, the term, in the literal sense of the word, means
the exchange of information over a great distance. Estaunie´ himself had a narrower meaning
in mind. To him telecommunication depended on electric transmission and encompassed tele-
graphy, telephony and wireless telegraphy only. For the purpose of this essay, however, the
use of electricity as a carrier should not be the defining feature of telecommunication. Instead,
the dematerialization of the transmitted information must be seen as the distinguishing mar-
ker. In the nineteenth century converting messages to electric impulses was only one – albeit
a widespread and important – method to achieve this and formed the technological basis of
electric telegraphy and later of telephony. The birth of telecommunication, however, had
but little to do with electricity. In the last decade of the eighteenth century, the Frenchman
Claude Chappe invented the system of optical telegraphy. Although later it could not compete
with its electric successor, optical telegraphy successfully detached long-distance communica-
tion from transportation for the first time.
This essay, however, is mainly concerned with electric telegraphy – the only telecommuni-
cation technology of global relevance in the nineteenth century. Although optical telegraphy
pioneered the idea of communication dematerialization, the system has never been adapted
beyond national level due to technical limitations. Likewise telephony – still in its infancy
in the late nineteenth century – was not yet advanced enough to negotiate distances larger
than a few hundred kilometres. Electric telegraphy, on the other hand, proved to be useful
for international communication very soon after its initial introduction. The first international
connection was established between the United States and Canada in the year 1846. England
and France were linked up by submarine cable only five years later. Telegraph cables soon
13 Roland Wenzlhuemer, ‘The development of telegraphy, 1870–1900: a European perspective on a world
history challenge’, History Compass, 5, 2007.
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criss-crossed the Mediterranean and began to connect continents. The transatlantic cables and
the imperial cables to India testify to the rapid global expansion of the telegraph network
since the 1850s.
This comes as no surprise. Whether a new technology manages to spread and to be
widely adopted mostly depends on the demand situation and therefore on the advantages
it offers compared to the next best alternative. In the case of national or regional telegraphic
networks, the long lack of public demand came to an end in the 1830s when railway expan-
sion created the need for fast and reliable communication to co-ordinate trains. Once in
place, the telegraph was quickly used for business, press or private messages as well.
Demand for international and intercontinental telegraphic connections came both from
national and imperial administrations as well as from the business sector. Here the next
best alternative – postal communication via steamer – was so much slower than a tele-
graphic message that the advantages of electric communication needed little explanation.
The potential gain in efficiency brought about by telecommunication clearly grows with
the distance between the communicating parties. Therefore, telegraphy did ‘go global’ as
soon as early technical problems with insulation and signal transmission had been solved.
British administrators welcomed the new ‘tool of Empire’14 as a means to bring their far-
flung colonies nearer to the metropolis. European merchant houses finally had an instru-
ment to direct their vessels once they had left European harbours15 – a situation similar
to the demand for telegraphic communication created by railway expansion.
Telegraphy: invention and innovation
Before we take a look at the spread of telegraphic communication in national contexts in the
nineteenth century and then start to examine the structure of the European telegraph network
in more detail, I will briefly outline the technological development behind early electric tele-
graphy. While the process of technical invention might be of only limited interest for the glo-
bal historian, it does set the stage for the following phase of innovation and early diffusion of
the technology. And here the influence of technological inertia16 and the importance of public
demand become clearly visible – an understanding of which forms the basis for our later
explorations.
In popular culture the invention of telegraphy is usually attributed to the American artist
and engineer Samuel Morse. The reasons for this ascription are manifold and range from the
superior capacity of the telegraphic code system that Morse co-invented via Morse’s success-
fully patent policy to the cultural hegemony of the United States in the twentieth century
which has helped popularize the idea of the ingenious American inventor. Beyond doubt,
Morse’s telegraph and code system – to which other inventors have significantly contributed
as well – proved to be the most efficient, flexible and easy to handle over the decades. In the
14 Daniel Headrick, The tools of empire: technology and European imperialism in the nineteenth century,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
15 Holten, ‘Telegraphy and business methods’.
16 The term has been coined by Joel Mokyr and refers to the built-in stability of technological systems and
their resistance to technological change. Joel Mokyr, ‘Technological inertia in economic history’, Journal
of Economic History, 52, 2, 1992, pp. 325–38.
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year 1900, for instance, most member states of the International Telegraph Union primarily
used Morse’s telegraphs. As can be seen in Table 1, Germany and Great Britain are the
only bigger states where the Morse system had encountered serious resistance from local
competitors.
In the early days of telegraphy, however, Samuel Morse was only one of many inventors
concerned with developing electric telecommunication. The earliest proposal for such an
outcome had been made as early as 1753 by an anonymous author in The Scots Magazine.
The article suggested the construction of an apparatus with one wire for each letter of the
alphabet running from sender to receiver. When the sender charged a wire, electrostatic
attraction would move a piece of paper with the corresponding letter on it. While somewhat
impracticable, the proposed system would certainly have worked. The same can be said
for the telegraphic devices developed by Samuel Thomas Soemmering (1809) and Francis
Ronalds (1816). Ronalds’s design had been influenced by Claude Chappe’s optical tachy-
graphe and employed moving pointers. The British Admiralty, however, showed no interest
whatsoever in the new technology and informed Ronalds that the existing system of optical
communication between London and the principal ports was absolutely sufficient. In short,
there was no official or public demand for such an expensive (at least in initial costs) and
untested technology.
The telegraphic devices of Paul Shilling von Canstatt (1832), Carl Friedrich Gauss
and Wilhelm Eduard Weber (1833) and Karl August Steinheil (1835) all suffered similar
fates, although they were all in a working order. Up to now only tentative suggestions
have been made as to why exactly these designs all failed to proliferate. Gauss, Weber
and Steinheil worked within the territory of today’s Germany. Split up in a multitude
of principalities during the first half of the nineteenth century, this might indeed not
have been the ideal testing ground for a centralizing and integrating technology like
the telegraph. Working for the Tsar, von Canstatt, however, should have encountered
many incentives to carry on his work and put the telegraph into practice in Russia.
More research into the factors preventing an adoption of the telegraph in these early
Table 1. Telegraph equipment in selected countries, 1900.
Morse Others Total
Germany 16,568 19,499 36,067
Austria 4,865 337 5,202
Spain 2,165 588 2,753
France 12,970 3,505 16,475
Great Britain 5,970 31,982 37,952
Hungary 4,627 529 5,156
India 9,434 4 9,438
Italy 9,898 307 10,205
Russia 5,257 508 5,765
Western Union Telegraph Company 77,626 3,582 81,208
Source: Bureau International des Administrations Te´le´graphiques, Statistique Ge´ne´rale de la
Te´le´graphie dresse´e d’apre`s des Documents Officiels, Anne´e 1900, Berne: Bureau International
des Administrations Te´le´graphiques, 1902.
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years will be necessary to fully understand the reasons why some designs failed and
others did not.
While the reasons for many of the failures still remain unclear, the cause behind the first
successful use and diffusion of telegraphy is comparatively well researched. In Great Britain,
Charles Wheatstone and William Fothergill Cooke worked on electric telegraphy as a classic
engineer-entrepreneur pair. Wheatstone perfected the mechanism and Cooke found a suitable
test application. Their telegraph was first installed and successfully tested between Euston and
Camden Town stations on the London and Birmingham Railway. Although the telegraph
worked absolutely satisfactorily and facilitated the co-ordination of line traffic, the railway
company chose not to adopt the new technology. Jeffrey Kieve cites the Guide to the London
and Birmingham Railway 1840 as stating on the matter: ‘Electricity was thought of as a
quicker signal agent and some successful experiments were tried with it, but experience has
proved that the whistle is more advantageous and suitable at every respect.’17 It took Cooke
another two years to convince Great Western Railways to test and adopt the technology
between their stations in West Drayton and Paddington. The connection went online in
1839 and marks the inauguration of the world’s first non-experimental telegraph line.18
Although only modestly used, it demonstrated for the first time the potentially profitable sym-
biosis between railway and telegraph companies. For the railway companies, the telegraph
provided the only means to co-ordinate their trains and to thereby use a single track in
both directions. For the prospective telegraph companies, the railways’ right-of-way was of
great appeal. Aware of this potential mutual benefit, Cooke eventually talked Great Western
Railways into allowing him to expand the existing line from West Drayton to Slough with all
expenses payable out of his own pocket. When the line was completed in 1843, Cooke opened
it for public commercial use, while the railway company was allowed to use it free of
charge.19
Although the benefits of erecting telegraph lines along their tracks had been quite
obvious to the railway companies from the late 1830s onwards, the high costs involved
had deterred many of them. Now that telegraphy had proved to be potentially profitable
in its own right as well, the companies’ reluctance was quickly overcome. In many cases
external investors could be attracted, in other cases the railway companies themselves chose
to run the telegraph operations. After 1843 the technology spread so quickly that, with
3,600 kilometres, almost a third of England’s railway network had been equipped with tele-
graph lines by 1850.20 Apart from the railway companies’ demand for swift communi-
cation, two other circumstances contributed to the rapid spread of telegraphy. First, the
press soon realized the potential telegraphy held for the provision of accurate and up-to-date
news. In England, the first press telegram was sent from Windsor Castle to London announ-
cing the birth of Prince Alfred. Second, the spectacular capture of the murderer John Tawell,
17 Guide to the London and Birmingham Railway 1840, cited in Jeffrey Kieve, The electric telegraph: a
social and economic history, Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1973, p. 28.
18 Anton A. Huurdeman, The worldwide history of telecommunications, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons,
2003, p. 67.
19 Kieve, Electric telegraph, p. 32.
20 Huurdeman, History of telecommunications, p. 70.
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made possible by rapid telegraphic communication, provided excellent publicity for the new
technology.21
In the United States, the first press telegram had been sent even a couple of months
before that, in late 1844. Samuel Morse had publicly demonstrated a working telegraph
in 1837, filed a caveat and applied for Congress funding of a proper test line. Thanks to
the early successes of Messrs Cooke and Wheatstone in Great Britain, Congress eventually
agreed to fund a telegraphic connection between Washington and Baltimore. In the year
1844, the line was inaugurated with the now-famous sentence ‘What hath God wrought?’.
After a one-year test period Congress did not anticipate much profit and gave the line back
into private responsibility.22 It was this act of privatization that triggered an investment
boom in telegraphy. Within the next ten years about 50,000 kilometres of telegraph wire
were put up in the United States, connecting practically all major settlements in the eastern
part of the country. Just like in the United Kingdom, railway companies became one major
carrier of the technology while the sheer size of the country provided an extra incentive for
telegraph expansion. In 1850, twenty private telegraph companies competed in the United
States, but it was the Western Union Telegraph Company that would eventually emerge
as the quasi-monopolist in telegraphic matters.23
Communication centres and peripheries
Little more than a decade ago, the sociologist Manuel Castells coined the term network
society and explained its rationale in a seminal three-volume publication known as the
Information Age trilogy.24 To Castells it is one of the distinguishing features of a network
that it has no centre – and thus no periphery.25 To a certain extent this might be true. No
node is absolutely essential to the network. Should one node fail, the network will reconfi-
gure itself and bypass the gap with the help of other nodes.26 However, this is not to say
that all nodes in a network are of the same importance or, as Castells puts forward, share
the same degree of centrality. Centrality here is not a geographic term but relates to the
21 On 1 January 1845, John Tawell killed his mistress in Slough and two days later fled to London by train.
As witnesses had seen him board the train to London, instructions were telegraphed to the police in
Paddington and Tawell was arrested upon his arrival. Before the installation of the telegraph, it would
have been impossible to inform London prior to the train’s arrival. See the aptly named chapter ‘The
cords that hung Tawell’, in Kieve, Electric telegraph, pp. 29–45.
22 Huurdeman, History of telecommunications, pp. 58–61.
23 Huurdeman, History of telecommunications, p. 63.
24 Manuel Castells, The rise of the network society, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1996; Manuel Castells, The
power of identity, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997; Manuel Castells, End of millennium, Malden, MA:
Blackwell, 1998.
25 Manuel Castells, ‘Informationalism, networks, and the network society: a theoretical blueprint’, in
Manuel Castells, ed., The network society: a cross-cultural perspective, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
2004, p. 3.
26 It was this flexibility and invulnerability of the network structure that first got the Defence Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) interested in computer networks in the 1960s. Even in the case of a
nuclear attack, such a communication network would reconfigure itself, bypass all annihilated nodes and
still function. From the modest beginnings of such research in the ARPAnet eventually developed today’s
internet.
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flow of information in a network – which, after all, is the essential purpose of a network.
Since the 1970s, Social Network Analysis (briefly introduced later in this paper) has aptly
demonstrated that some nodes are indeed more important for the efficient functioning of
the network and that they are closer to the actual information flow. Our own analysis
will confirm this.
Therefore, it seems absolutely reasonable to assume that global telecommunication
networks (as all other networks of a similar structure) do have centres and peripheries,
i.e. certain nodes that are closer and other nodes that are further from the information
flow. But where is the benefit in clearly identifying such nodes with the help of quantitative
methods? Is it not evident that regions such as Great Britain or New England in the United
States were communication centres, while other regions outside the ‘West’ formed the per-
iphery? In short, is it not reasonable to assume that the centrality pattern of the global com-
munication network resembles an underlying socioeconomic pattern about which we already
know much? From a general perspective this is probably true, but our analysis will provide a
more refined picture and will, as shall be seen, produce some interesting results. In the end,
this essay seeks to identify suitable cases (of countries or cities) for later comparative studies
that will try to establish how centrality in global communication impacted on local develop-
ment. If we merely compare the obvious centres and peripheries, the insights generated by
such a comparison will be limited and distorted by a variety of other contributing factors.
However, if we succeed in identifying comparable pairs that differ only in individual cate-
gories and aspects, a comparison will hopefully leave us with accurate and concise findings
as to the potential impact of global connectivity on local development.
From its very onset telegraphy developed at two different levels. On the one hand it
spread along railway tracks and roads and brought the remoter regions of a country into
contact with the administrative centre. Centres of industry were connected with financial
centres, new territories were opened up and hitherto peripheral regions were brought under
closer central control. In short, telegraphic expansion here served the purpose of national
integration and centralization. For reasons outlined above, railway companies played a cru-
cial role in weaving such national telegraph networks as did many other private telegraph
companies such as Western Union in the United States or the ‘Electric’ and the ‘Magnetic’27
in Great Britain prior to 1870. In many cases, however, the expansion and maintenance of
the national telegraph network was a state enterprise under close ministerial control. France
and Germany are two excellent examples of such a policy. The construction and expansion
of a national telegraph network during Japan’s rapid industrialization from the 1860s
onwards provides another example for strictly state-controlled telecommunication develop-
ment.28 And even Great Britain, where free enterprise and entrepreneurship formed the very
foundation of the economy, domestic telegraphy was nationalized by the Telegraph Act
of 1868 (and with effect from 1870). Additional to the creation of a national telegraph
network, there were soon efforts to establish international telegraphic connections as
27 Until the nationalization of telegraphy in 1870, the Electric and International Telegraph Company (the
‘Electric’) and the British & Irish Magnetic Telegraph Company (the ‘Magnetic’) were the two biggest
telegraph companies in the UK.
28 Marie Anchordoguy, ‘Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company (NTT) and the building of a
telecommunications industry in Japan’, Business History Review, 75, 3, 2001, p. 509.
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well – first between neighbouring countries, but soon also spanning continents and oceans.
Only years after domestic telegraphy had started to emerge, a global telecommunication net-
work began to be woven. This study endeavours to identify the communication centres and
peripheries in such a network. Both the degree of international connectivity and the rate of
the internal telegraphic development of a nation play crucial roles in such an assessment.
Only if a nation has both a well-developed domestic telegraph network and is tightly
connected to other network nodes beyond its borders, can we really speak of a communica-
tion centre. Lew and Cater even say that there is a direct correlation between the use of a
country’s domestic network and its global connections. ‘Generally, the greater the domestic
telegraph usage the greater the international usage. [. . .] Domestic and international mes-
sages [in the sample of Lew’s and Cater’s article] have a correlation coefficient of 0.97.’29
The domestic lines provide the essential link between the global and the local. Only if this
link is complete, can the global impact on the local – or vice versa. Therefore, we will first
take a look at the creation of domestic networks in different regions of the world during the
nineteenth century and then set out to examine the structure of a specific part of the inter-
national telegraph network in more detail. Due to the availability of statistical material, this
detailed network analysis can only concentrate on Europe for which we have suitable circuit
data available. While it is hoped that future research will also provide us with usable circuit
data for North America, it seems unlikely that such material can be uncovered for the
non-Western world. A network analysis of the submarine telegraph network – for which
abundant data is available – will also only yield partially valuable results, as such a study
can only cover the marine parts of the network and suffers from huge gaps wherever land-
line data does not exist. Therefore, we will have to settle for the circuit material that is avail-
able at the moment. And these are mainly figures for Europe in the early twentieth century.
National telegraphic development
The statistical data presented in the following have been collected in the archives of the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in Geneva, Switzerland. Today a specialized
agency of the United Nations, the ITU was founded as the Bureau International des Admin-
istrations Te´le´graphiques by the signing parties of the 1868 Confe´rence Te´le´graphique Inter-
nationale in Vienna. It had its headquarters in Berne, Switzerland, and was eventually
renamed the International Telegraph Union. It was the main purpose both of the telegraphic
conferences of the mid-nineteenth century and of the bureau to facilitate and monitor inter-
national telegraphy. To this end the ITU collected a wealth of statistical material on the
domestic networks of its member states as well. Although the data is not as complex and
detailed as some of the material that can be found in the archives of the national telegraph
administrations, it has one distinct advantage: it has been compiled and prepared in order
to allow for comparisons between the different member states.
The ITU started to request statistical information from its member states immediately after
its foundation and, additionally, tried to retrospectively gather information on network
growth prior to 1870 as well. The material received from the national administrations for
29 Lew and Cater, ‘Co-ordination of tramp shipping’, p. 163.
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this early period was not plentiful, and was of mixed quality. The domestic telegraph com-
panies in Great Britain, for instance, did not submit any useful data. Other members such as
Prussia (later the North German Confederation and then the German Empire respectively)
or Austria-Hungary, however, provided material from 1849 onwards. France has con-
tributed to the ITU surveys since 1851. Unfortunately, the ITU statistics do not hold any
information on telegraphic development outside Europe for this early period of
telecommunication development.
A quick look at the early statistical material (see Table 2) shows that among the bigger
European states, Prussia (and its successors), France and Great Britain developed quickest
and managed to erect reasonably dense telegraphic networks. In the year 1868, for instance,
the recently created North German Confederation features a density of 57 km of telegraph
lines per 1,000 square km. Among the larger countries, only France (70 km per 1,000 sq
km) and Great Britain (86 km per 1,000 sq km) are doing better. Although Austria-Hungary
had almost as many kilometres of telegraph lines as Germany up and working by 1868, it
lagged behind in terms of network density with only 38 km per 1,000 sq km. Interestingly,
smaller states such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland led in terms of network
density. Switzerland inaugurated its telegraphic network in the year 1852 only, but already
exhibits an impressive 46 km of telegraph lines per 1,000 sq km in that year. The figure
keeps increasing and reaches 110 in 1869. Similarly, Belgium sets out with 14 km per
1,000 sq km in 1851 and eventually reaches the extremely impressive figure of 143 in
1869, while the Netherlands starts with a comparatively modest ratio of 5 in 1852 but
also reach 85 in 1869. These figures confirm the findings of an earlier study, in which I
have examined the development of domestic telegraphy between 1870 and 1900, i.e. at a
time when the ITU data supply was much more constant and reliable. In order to guarantee
better comparability of the network development in different states and world regions, the
earlier study works with statistical material indexed towards a selected European average.30
The data prepared in this way provides a comparative perspective on global telegraphic
development in the closing third of the nineteenth century. It probably comes as little sur-
prise that Europe and North America outpace most other world regions in the extent and
usage of their telegraph networks. Not only did telegraphy technically originate there, the
domestic expansion of the technology was also favoured by the creation of vast transport
networks and their excellent positions in the global trade network. ITU data on North
America concentrates exclusively on the United States of America. Although ‘the United
States remained the only industrialized nation without a government telegraph service’ after
the British telegraph companies had been nationalized in 1870,31 Western Union had prac-
tically monopolized the telecommunication business. The company submitted statistical
data to the ITU at irregular intervals. As can be seen from Table 3, the Western Union tele-
graph network could not compete with the European average in line density or bureau den-
sity per surface area. Yet, this must mainly be attributed to the vastness of the country and
the concentration of the network in several densely populated regions – for instance in and
30 The exact method and the composition of the selected European average have been explained in some
detail in Wenzlhuemer, ‘The development of telegraphy’.
31 David Hochfelder, ‘A comparison of the postal telegraph movement in Great Britain and the United
States, 1866–1900’, Enterprise & Society, 1, 2000, p. 746.
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Table 2. Length of telegraph lines per area in selected countries (km per 1,000 sq km).
1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859
Prussia/NGF* 7.68 8.72 10.68 11.90 13.37 14.93 16.22 19.05 21.03 25.19 25.95
Austria/Hungary 2.46 4.54 5.33 6.22 7.50 9.61 10.58 12.23 12.86 14.95 17.56
Belgium n/a n/a 13.93 22.78 23.69 24.61 26.58 27.15 29.42 35.83 48.10
France n/a n/a 4.02 6.69 13.53 17.62 19.80 21.24 21.55 24.57 29.80
Netherlands n/a n/a n/a 5.18 8.69 27.52 30.37 31.93 33.25 33.51 38.92
Switzerland n/a n/a n/a 46.36 46.89 47.52 52.59 58.11 59.37 59.68 64.10
Great Britain n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869
Prussia/NGF* 27.49 30.27 34.77 41.09 46.45 50.49 53.93 62.47 56.89 60.15
Austria/Hungary 19.79 20.42 22.29 25.49 26.52 29.49 30.30 33.53 37.64 n/a
Belgium 49.66 58.54 64.07 89.73 101.29 109.15 119.29 131.49 138.27 143.02
France 43.22 43.76 47.73 49.20 51.36 54.70 59.41 64.82 70.29 79.15
Netherlands 46.03 49.40 50.28 55.86 59.37 60.04 65.70 70.90 77.36 85.69
Switzerland 69.68 72.19 76.60 77.07 80.18 82.86 85.93 93.44 103.53 110.30
Great Britain n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 86.53 n/a
Source: Bureau International des Administrations Te´le´graphiques, Statistique Ge´ne´rale de la Te´le´graphie dans les Diffe´rents Pays de l’Ancien Continent, Berne: Imprimerie
Rieder & Simmer, 1871.
Remarks: *Until 1866 Prussia is the unit of study. From 1867 onwards, the data represents the North German Confederation.
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Table 3. Length of telegraph lines per area and number of telegraph bureaus per area and inhabitants in selected countries, 1870–1900 (indexed data).
Lines per area Bureaus per area Bureaus per inhabitants
1870 1880 1890 1900 1870 1880 1890 1900 1870 1880 1890 1900
Algeria n/a 52** 11 15 n/a 13** 5 5 n/a 42** 54 43
Austria 96 144 88 95 84 103 100 96 84 96 91 84
Belgium 257 235 221 186 348 319 255 203 139 116 89 66
Brazil n/a 9 n/a 3 n/a 2 n/a 1 n/a n/a n/a 36
Cochin-China n/a 36 10 12 n/a 7 2 2 n/a 17 15 9
Denmark 87 111 113 87 88 87 78 68 127 118 99 81
Dutch Indies n/a 5 5 4 n/a 1 1 1 n/a 3 5 5
Egypt n/a 10 n/a n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a n/a 25 n/a n/a
France 138 161 177 225 138 126 147 129 128 123 146 136
Germany 115* 162 185 203 153* 226 258 240 138* 184 203 174
Great Britain n/a 166 156 201 314 210 193 193 203 131 116 112
India 10 10 16 20 1 4 7 7 1 5 7 7
Italy 104 110 117 125 86 95 108 109 66 69 78 74
Japan n/a 22 33 62 n/a 6 7 23 n/a 5 5 15
Natal n/a n/a n/a 36 n/a n/a n/a 14 n/a n/a n/a 99
Netherlands 159 143 153 160 165 146 182 160 96 81 95 78
New Zealand n/a 50 31 38 n/a 17 16 19 n/a 389 448 482
Russia 4 5 5 6 1 1 1 1 14 24 21 9
Senegal n/a n/a 14 8 n/a n/a 1 1 n/a n/a 96 12
Switzerland 218 195 168 143 304 325 266 269 327 325 273 255
Tunisia n/a see Algeria 23 26 n/a see Algeria 4 5 n/a see Algeria 24 31
Victoria n/a 28 27 39 n/a 15 26 10 n/a 272 420 149
Western
Union
n/a 28 n/a 34 n/a 17 n/a 16 n/a 177 n/a 120
Source: Bureau International des Administrations Te´le´graphiques, Statistique Ge´ne´rale de la Te´le´graphie dans les Diffe´rents Pays de l’Ancien Continent, Anne´e 1870,
Berne: Imprimerie Rieder & Simmer, 1873; Bureau International des Administrations Te´le´graphiques, Statistique Ge´ne´rale de la Te´le´graphie dresse´e d’apre`s des Documents
Officiels, Anne´e 1880, Berne: Imprimerie Rieder & Simmer, 1882; Bureau International des Administrations Te´le´graphiques, Statistique Ge´ne´rale de la Te´le´graphie dresse´e
d’apre`s des Documents Officiels, Anne´e 1890, Berne: Imprimerie Gebhardt, Ro¨sch & Schatzmann, 1892; Bureau International, Statistique Ge´ne´rale, Anne´e 1900.
Remarks: *In 1870 the data for Germany encompasses only the North German Confederation, Baden, Bavaria and Wurttemberg. Later data refers to the German Empire.
**In 1880 the data for Algeria includes Tunisia as well. All data is indexed with one hundred representing the selected European average of each year.
T
H
E
D
E
M
A
T
E
R
I
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
O
F
T
E
L
E
C
O
M
M
U
N
I
C
A
T
I
O
N
j j3
5
9
around the New England area. These geographical and demographical factors distort the
per-area figures, but it can clearly be seen that the United States performs excellently in sev-
eral per-head categories with highly competitive ratios of bureaus (Table 3) and internal
messages per inhabitants (Table 4).
Turning to Europe, Russia represents a similarly distorted but less developed case. Like
the New England region in the United States, the European part of Russia also maintained
an early tight telecommunication network. However, most of the eastern parts of the
country – such as Siberia – were only marginally (if at all) developed in this regard. Simi-
larly, this distorts all figures relative to the area of the country as can be seen in Table 3.
Even in the case of Russia, where the gap in the per-area categories is extremely pro-
nounced, we can see a better performance in the per-head categories. Although this indicates
that both the United States and Russia indeed had telegraphically very well developed
Table 4. Internal and external telegraphic messages per inhabitants in selected countries, 1870–1900
(indexed data).
Internal messages per inhabitants External messages per inhabitants
1870 1880 1890 1900 1870 1880 1890 1900
Algeria n/a 123** 113 120 n/a 60** 8 4
Austria 61 68 57 85 91 72 85 87
Belgium 191 167 145 140 173 201 206 175
Brazil n/a n/a n/a 20 n/a n/a n/a 1
Cochin-China n/a 12 16 22 n/a 5 5 6
Denmark 84 107 87 77 210 261 206 218
Dutch Indies n/a 7 4 3 n/a 2 2 3
Egypt n/a 20 n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a n/a
France 91 196 259 301 52 74 83 72
Germany 99* 114 123 163 125* 79 78 77
Great Britain n/a 343 536 566 n/a 91 96 93
India 2 3 4 5 0 1 1 1
Italy 51 84 81 80 38 32 25 26
Japan n/a 23 33 89 n/a 1 1 4
Natal n/a n/a n/a 1099 n/a n/a n/a 38
Netherlands 207 215 159 153 255 230 217 177
New Zealand n/a 1226 963 1341 n/a 40 33 53
Russia 18 29 27 34 8 10 7 7
Senegal n/a n/a 93 24 n/a n/a 14 3
Switzerland 309 282 223 135 252 287 280 254
Tunisia n/a see Algeria 43 50 n/a see Algeria 55 93
Victoria n/a 610 856 360 n/a 9 206 88
Western Union n/a 294 n/a 231 n/a n/a n/a 8
Source: Bureau International, Statistique Ge´ne´rale, Anne´e 1870; Bureau International, Statistique Ge´ne´rale,
Anne´e 1880; Bureau International, Statistique Ge´ne´rale, Anne´e 1890; Bureau International, Statistique
Ge´ne´rale, Anne´e 1900.
Remarks: *In 1870 the data for Germany encompasses only the North German Confederation, Baden,
Bavaria and Wurttemberg. Later data refers to the German Empire. **In 1880 the data for Algeria
includes Tunisia as well. All data is indexed with one hundred representing the selected European average
of each year.
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regions, the ITU data does not allow us to examine these regions in greater detail as it is
severely distorted due to the sheer size of both countries.
In Europe, Belgium and Switzerland feature extremely tight telegraphic networks and a
high rate of telegraph lines per size of country throughout the period of observation – even
if Switzerland starts to lose out on its competitors towards the end of the century. Among
the smaller states, the Netherlands and – with a certain lag – Denmark also belong to the
top group. This can at least partly be attributed to their compactness (true for all), their mar-
itime trading tradition and excellent integration in a global telecommunication network (true
for all but Switzerland) or the central geographical and commercial position in Europe (true
for Switzerland). Among the larger European nations, Great Britain clearly has the best-
developed domestic telegraph network in (or around) the year 1870. France and Germany
do quite well, but cannot compete with Great Britain in terms of lines per surface or telegraph
bureaus per inhabitants. By around 1880, however, both the German Empire and France have
almost fully caught up with Great Britain in line density. And Germany has clearly outper-
formed Britain in bureaus per inhabitants. Only in the categories ‘wires per area’ and ‘internal
messages per inhabitants’ does Great Britain still show the most impressive ratios. In 1890 as
well as in 1900, the three big players Great Britain, France and Germany are roughly on par
in terms of lines per area. The German Empire had massively invested in telegraph bureaus
and displays the best ratio of bureaus per area and per head in the top group.
Outside Europe and North America, most of the data held in ITU statistics refers to cur-
rent or former European colonies (or informal parts of the British Empire in the case of
Egypt in the year 1880). Japan presents the only exception to this rule in Tables 3 and 4.
Although the country lags far behind the European average for most of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the figures clearly reflect the massive investment in industrialization and moderniza-
tion during the Meiji period. In the last ten years of the nineteenth century particularly
we can see a surge in telegraphic development. In this period, Japan pushes its ‘lines-per-
area’ ratio from 33% to 62% of the respective selected European average. The ratio of
‘internal messages per inhabitants’ almost reaches that threshold in 1900. Although there
is some growth in the number of external messages as well, the low ratio here aptly mirrors
the country’s continued isolation from the rest of the world.
The available data on self-governing European colonies such as Victoria or New
Zealand show only marginally developed telecommunication networks (in and around the
social and economic centres). But compared to non-settler colonies (or ex-colonies) such
as Brazil, Cochin-China, the Dutch Indies or Senegal, these territories feature the relatively
denser networks. As can be clearly seen in Tables 3 and 4, most colonies of domination were
practically not developed in telecommunications. Those few lines in existence usually served
the colonial administrators or connected the principal ports with the important economic
regions. As is often the case with ‘the jewel in the crown’, India presents a certain exception
to this rule. Given its sheer size and population density, the indexed figures for India are still
quite impressive. In the year 1900, its line density reaches 20% of the European average.
This might not seem much at first glance, but is put into perspective when compared to
considerably smaller and less populated colonies such as, for instance, the Dutch Indies.
The extraordinarily high figures for Natal, New Zealand and Victoria in the ‘messages
per inhabitants’ categories mainly stem from the sparse populations rather than from
unusually high telegraphic activity. Apart from the territories covered here, the ITU statistics
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hold little information on telegraph penetration outside Europe. This incompleteness (or dis-
tortion) of the extra-European statistical material is a recurring feature in nineteenth-
century telecommunication history. While data on intercontinental submarine or overland
connections is relatively plentiful, the growth of the domestic networks outside Europe
and North America is only scarcely documented.
But despite the incompleteness of the available source, the above analysis of ITU data on
domestic telegraphy has clearly shown that mainly European countries developed and main-
tained the densest networks in the nineteenth century. Figure 1 illustrates where the telegra-
phically best developed countries in Europe were situated in the year 1900. Non-European
countries and colonies generally lagged behind in this development. In most cases tele-
graphic communication focused on the economic centres and completely neglected the com-
mercially less interesting parts of the country. The cases of the United States and Russia
highlight the limitations of an analysis of the statistical material collected by the ITU. The
data allows us to compare a growing number of countries in terms of the domestic tele-
graphic development, but the figures on the number of international messages sent and
received are the only indicator as to the international connectivity of a country. Table 4
shows the ratio of external messages sent and received per head. The data is also indexed
with a selected European average as one hundred and clearly shows that the same smaller
states lead the field here as well. In proportion to their population size, these countries – all
Figure 1. Map showing the density of telegraph lines per area (km per 1,000 sq km) in
Europe, 1900.
Source: Bureau International des Administrations Te´le´graphiques, Statistique Ge´ne´rale
de la Te´le´graphie dresse´e d’apre`s des Documents Officiels, Anne´e 1900, Berne: Bureau Inter-
national des Administrations Te´le´graphiques, 1902; borders by the author.
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integrated and participating in a global market – sent and received the highest number of
international messages.32 All the bigger European players rank slightly under the average
of one hundred, with Great Britain clearly leading in this group and France and Germany
both lagging behind a little in international telegraphic communication. Although the avail-
able data is crude, this seems to confirm Britain’s central role in international telecommuni-
cation during the nineteenth century. While states with considerably smaller populations
and a nevertheless pronounced interest in global market operations feature much higher
ratios of external messages per head, Great Britain leads among the bigger countries. Unfor-
tunately, the figures presented here can only give a first clue towards establishing inter-
national telecommunication centres and peripheries. The material does not allow for any
assessment of the directions of information flow or for the identification of better- and
worse-connected regions within a country. Only access to more detailed data compiled by
the national telegraph administrations and the private submarine cable companies will
make an in-depth examination possible here. In the case of Great Britain, for instance, the
nationalization of the domestic telegraph network led to a number of surveys that provide
us with information on messages sent from and received at all telegraph stations. The pre-
paration and analysis of this data will take several more months and is extremely time-
consuming. Even then, it will enlighten us about British regional connectivity but with
only very limited international comparison.
International connectivity in Europe
Such a detailed analysis of sent and received domestic and international messages will allow for a
use-oriented33 study of international telegraphy. It will for the first time enable us to assess not
just the maximum capacities of a network, but also howmuch such a potential has actually been
used. This will shed more light on the difference between theoretical capabilities and actual
demand for telecommunication. Until such data is available, however, we will have to resort
to cruder methods. A circuit analysis, for instance, can help with identifying communication
centres and peripheries beyond the national level. Here, existing direct connections between
regions (represented by cities and towns) are interpreted with the help of Social Network Ana-
lysis (SNA) software. The software calculates several different indicators for a node’s position
in the network and thus identifies communication centres and peripheries within the network.
As the name suggests, Social Network Analysis was originally designed to examine the
functioning of social networks, i.e. of complex connections between people. The mathema-
tical methods and calculations on which SNA rests, however, can in most cases be directly
applied to other networks as well.34 While human networks differ substantially from, for
32 Norway, Luxembourg and Victoria also featured high rates, but this can be explained by the extremely
small populations of these countries.
33 David Edgerton has repeatedly and convincingly made the case for the study of technologies-in-use rather
than inventions, if we want to assess the socioeconomic significance of a particular technology. See David
Edgerton, The shock of the old: technology and global history since 1900, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007; David Edgerton, ‘From innovation to use: ten eclectic theses on the historiography of
technology’, History and Technology, 16, 1999, pp. 1–26.
34 Boris Holzer, Netzwerke, Bielefeld: Transcript, 2006, p. 34.
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instance, telecommunication networks in their purpose and their development patterns,
their structure and functioning is essentially the same. Connections between individual
nodes form the network and stand at the centre of Social Network Analysis. The SNA soft-
ware, therefore, interprets data on telegraphic intercity connections with the same accuracy
as it processes social network data. However, since we will be feeding the programme with
statistical material on existing telegraphic circuits at a given point in time, there is one
important difference that we will have to keep in mind. While datasets on social networks
usually show connections only when there is indeed interaction between the two nodes, cir-
cuit data only tells us about the communication potential. An existing direct circuit
between, say, London and Paris, indicates the potential of information flow between the
two nodes. The hardware is in place. While it is likely that most potentials have indeed
been used, nothing definite can be said about the actual flow of information. In contrast
to the study of social networks, our results therefore only mirror the centrality of the nodes
in terms of communication potential.
Applying SNA methods to telegraphic connections encounters one more difficulty. Accu-
rate circuit data is almost as hard to prepare as data on sent and received messages. Most of
the surviving statistical material on existing circuits is fragmented and notoriously hard
to piece together. Here, again, it will take some more work until a reliable dataset can be
created just for Great Britain. In isolated instances, however, the ITU has already done
some of the necessary work for us. The following analysis, for instance, is based on the
‘Carte Sche´matique des Grandes Communications Te´le´graphiques Internationales du
Re´gime Europe´en’ compiled by the ITU in the year 1923 and held in its archives. The
map shows all existing direct telegraphic connections between cities and towns in Europe.
The connections shown on the map have all been entered into a data matrix that forms
the basis of the Social Network Analysis. The analysis itself has been conducted with Ucinet
for Windows, version 6.145.35 We will have to keep in mind that all extra-European con-
nections (except the cross-Mediterranean links) only show one terminus at which the net-
work then ends. In reality, however, many more nodes continued the network in, for
instance, North America or Asia. The results of our SNA must, unfortunately, ignore all
parts of the global telecommunication network that cannot be found on the map. This natu-
rally distorts some of the findings and downplays the importance of the nodes at or near the
major cable landing sites. This deficiency can only be overcome if a global telecommunica-
tions map featuring all major network nodes and links can one day be compiled.
Table 536 lists 37 of the 289 cities and towns included on the ‘Carte Sche´matique’
ranked according to their Freeman degree Centrality. The calculation of the Freeman degree
is one of the most widely used centrality measures in Social Network Analysis and sim-
ply counts the number of connections that a node has to other nodes. Valued data37 is
35 Stephen P. Borgatti, Martin G. Everett and Linton C. Freeman, Ucinet for Windows: software for social
network analysis, Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies, 2002.
36 All other tables only list 29 network nodes, i.e. 10% of the total. Table 5, however, lists 37 nodes
because nodes 27 to 37 all show the same Freeman degree.
37 Valued data represents the different strengths of relations between network nodes. In our case, a
connection comprising of several telegraph circuits has been weighted higher in the original data matrix
than one made of only a single line. Some SNA methods do recognize such valued data, others convert it
to binary data.
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recognized by the Freeman degree measure, and therefore circuits with bigger capacities are
treated accordingly. For the same reason, the normalized degree (nDegree) has not been
included in the table as it should only be calculated for binary data. The comparatively
unsophisticated degree count shows that London (conveniently leading), Paris and Berlin
maintain the highest number of direct connections to other places. Vienna follows at
Table 5. Degree centrality of top thirty-seven network nodes.
Node Name Degree
150 London 69
195 Paris 58
24 Berlin 50
279 Wien 41
44 Budapest 30
5 Amsterdam 23
73 Danzig 21
113 Hamburg 21
205 Praha 20
8 Anvers 20
42 Bruxelles 20
214 Rotterdam 18
161 Malta 17
94 Frankfurt 16
166 Marseille 15
172 Milano 14
104 Gibraltar 14
276 Warschau 14
178 Mu¨nchen 14
288 Zu¨rich 13
16 Basel 12
265 Trieste 11
129 Ko¨ln 10
197 Penzance 10
277 Waterville 10
96 Fredericia 10
82 Du¨sseldorf 9
122 Katowice 9
22 Beograd 9
130 Ko¨nigsberg 9
254 Thessaloniki 9
53 Carcavelos 9
127 Kjo¨benhavn 9
38 Breslau 9
243 Strasbourg 9
241 Stockholm 9
211 Riga 9
Source: Carte Schematique des Grandes Communications Te´le´graphiques
Internationales du Re´gime Europe´en dresse´e par le Bureau International de
l’Union Te´le´graphique, ITU Library and Archives, Geneva, 1 December 1923.
Software: Ucinet 6 for Windows
Remarks: The place names in the table resemble the language and spelling used in
the original map.
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some distance. Maybe a little surprisingly, Budapest comes fifth before Amsterdam starts
to represent the well-developed maritime nations that have done so well in the domestic
telegraph study. Zurich and Basel rank twentieth and twenty-first in the list and cannot
quite live up to the excellent performance of Switzerland in the domestic statistics. It is inter-
esting to see that seemingly unimportant places such as Malta, Gibraltar, Penzance or
Waterville are included in Table 5. This reflects the gateway function of these towns which
all occupied strategically important positions in the global telegraph network. Together
with, for instance, Brest and Porthcurno, Penzance and Waterville serve as landing sites
for most of the Atlantic submarine cables. Gibraltar and Malta are the British strongholds
in the Mediterranean and practically all Asian connections via Alexandria and Suez
passed through here. Similarly, Carcavelos was an important junction for the Atlantic and
Mediterranean cables.
The Freeman degree analysis only shows us how many direct connections a specific
node maintained to other nodes in the network. While it is often illuminating to have this
information broken down into clear figures, it tells us little about the qualitative position
of a node in a network. In his categorization of network analysis methods, Linton Freeman
presents two other ways of calculating centrality in a network beyond the simple degree
value – closeness and betweenness.38 Both only operate with binary connections and do
not recognize valued data. They ignore the strength of the link between two nodes and
are rather interested in their positions within a network. Table 6 shows the farness and
the closeness of the top twenty-nine nodes in our network. Farness is the sum of connections
it takes for a node to reach each and every other network node.39 The higher the number of
connections, the less central is the node. Closeness is the reciprocal value of farness. In its
normalized form as nCloseness it shows the percentage of the highest possible closeness
value. In our network analysis, the top twenty-nine nodes in terms of closeness are surpris-
ingly near together. Paris reaches every other node in the network in 12,460 steps. Ranking
twenty-ninth, Gdan´sk needs only 252 steps more than that. Even Benghazi, which is not
included in the table but ranks last in the main network body, needs only 13,541 steps.
The normalized closeness ranges from 2.311% in the case of Paris via 2.276% for Gdan´sk
to 2.127% for Benghazi. Paris, Berlin and London again top the list, but are only marginally
closer to the rest of the network than other nodes. This can be seen as proof that the Eur-
opean telegraph network fulfilled its central purpose and brought most places in Europe clo-
ser together. The network was very well integrated and all the cities and towns connected to
the main network were reasonably easy to reach from any other position in the net. The
marginal advantages of the French, German and British metropoles do not count much
here. As a matter of fact most places were – telegraphically speaking – equally close or
far from each other.
The picture we get when we look at the third Freeman method, betweenness, is subs-
tantially different. Betweenness refers to the centrality of a network node in terms of its
38 Linton C. Freeman, ‘Centrality in networks: 1. Conceptual clarification’, Social Networks, 1, 1979,
pp. 215–39; Linton C. Freeman, ‘The gatekeeper, pair-dependency, and structural centrality’,
Quality and Quantity, 14, 1980, pp. 585–92.
39 Technically, farness (and, thus, closeness) cannot be calculated for the entire network in our example as
certain parts are not connected to the main body and farness would have an infinite value. Therefore, the
figures here only represent the main body of the network.
366 j
j
R O L A N D W E N Z L H U E M E R
mediating position in the network. It describes how often the shortest connection between
two nodes passes through a certain node and is therefore a clear indicator for the impor-
tance of a particular city or town for the efficient functioning of the entire network. The
normalized value nBetweenness is the original value divided by the maximum number of
node pairs excluding the evaluated node. Table 7 shows that Berlin, Paris and London
clearly rank highest in terms of mediating centrality. Vienna follows fourth but reaches
only around 12% in nBetweenness. Prague and Budapest lag far behind with slightly over
8% each. Fredericia first represents the small coastal countries that did so well in the study
of the development of domestic telegraphy. Rotterdam only comes in twenty-seventh in
this category, followed by Zurich as the first Swiss city. Therefore, both degree and
Table 6. Closeness centrality of top twenty-nine network nodes.
Node Name Farness nCloseness
195 Paris 12460 2.311
24 Berlin 12460 2.311
150 London 12494 2.305
205 Praha 12502 2.304
279 Wien 12515 2.301
113 Hamburg 12518 2.301
288 Zu¨rich 12566 2.292
8 Anvers 12569 2.291
94 Frankfurt 12572 2.291
178 Mu¨nchen 12572 2.291
42 Bruxelles 12576 2.29
5 Amsterdam 12576 2.29
214 Rotterdam 12580 2.289
44 Budapest 12586 2.288
172 Milano 12602 2.285
276 Warschau 12609 2.284
96 Fredericia 12614 2.283
129 Ko¨ln 12618 2.282
16 Basel 12620 2.282
108 Gravenhage 12628 2.281
77 Dresden 12641 2.278
41 Brno 12642 2.278
82 Du¨sseldorf 12642 2.278
35 Bratislava 12642 2.278
138 Leipzig 12644 2.278
166 Marseille 12646 2.277
25 Bern 12648 2.277
213 Roma 12650 2.277
73 Danzig 12652 2.276
Source: Carte Schematique des Grandes Communications Te´le´graphiques
Internationales du Re´gime Europe´en dresse´e par le Bureau International de l’Union
Te´le´graphique, ITU Library and Archives, Geneva, 1 December 1923.
Software: Ucinet 6 for Windows
Remarks: The place names in the table resemble the language and spelling used in the
original map.
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betweenness centrality put the findings of the domestic telegraphy figures into perspective. It
is clearly the bigger European countries such as Great Britain, France and Germany (and
their capitals) that occupied the central positions in the telegraph network in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century. The high betweenness values for Berlin, Paris, London
and, to a lesser extent, Vienna emphasize these cities’ central positions in the telegraphic
data flow. It was highly likely that a message sent between two European places would
pass through one of these central junctions. And especially for London we could even expect
a somewhat higher rate if the data used were to include the North American and South
Asian networks as well.
Table 7. Betweenness centrality of top twenty-nine network nodes.
Node Name Betweenness nBetweenness
24 Berlin 8434.273 20.408
195 Paris 8296.616 20.075
150 London 8204.229 19.852
279 Wien 4983.795 12.059
205 Praha 3462.52 8.378
44 Budapest 3381.937 8.183
113 Hamburg 2319.863 5.613
96 Fredericia 2079.51 5.032
73 Danzig 2018.054 4.883
166 Marseille 1998.448 4.836
104 Gibraltar 1956.103 4.733
161 Malta 1716.444 4.153
213 Roma 1659.672 4.016
22 Beograd 1599.634 3.871
254 Thessaloniki 1459 3.53
178 Mu¨nchen 1282.23 3.103
77 Dresden 1271.256 3.076
137 Le Havre 1268.666 3.07
86 Fayal 1210 2.928
39 Brest 1197.683 2.898
172 Milano 1159.954 2.807
265 Trieste 1159.318 2.805
283 Zakynthos 1134.396 2.745
16 Basel 1114.059 2.696
122 Katowice 1081.076 2.616
276 Warschau 1011.425 2.447
214 Rotterdam 1006.408 2.435
288 Zu¨rich 997.097 2.413
43 Bucuresti 984.375 2.382
Source: Carte Schematique des Grandes Communications Te´le´graphiques
Internationales du Re´gime Europe´en dresse´e par le Bureau International de l’Union
Te´le´graphique, ITU Library and Archives, Geneva, 1 December 1923.
Software: Ucinet 6 for Windows
Remarks: Data is symmetric and has been binarized for the calculation of betweenness.
The place names in the table resemble the language and spelling used in the original
map.
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Finally, we should also take a look at Bonacich’s eigenvector method.40 Here a node is
central when it is connected to other central nodes. Table 8 lists the top twenty-nine nodes
in our network sorted by their eigenvector value and giving normalized values for Freeman
degree, closeness and betweenness as well. Paris, Berlin and London can again be found at
the top end of the list, but London interestingly does much worse than the other two.
Vienna comes as usual fourth, but then we quickly find places such as Antwerp (fifth),
Brussels (eighth), Amsterdam (ninth), Rotterdam (eleventh) or Zurich (twelfth) in the list.
Table 8. Bonacich eigenvector centrality of top twenty-nine network nodes.
Node Name nDegree nCloseness nBetweenness nEigenvector
195 Paris 11.458 2.311 20.075 49.974
24 Berlin 11.111 2.311 20.408 45.439
150 London 10.417 2.305 19.852 39.414
279 Wien 10.417 2.301 12.059 34.743
8 Anvers 4.861 2.291 0.982 30.808
113 Hamburg 5.556 2.301 5.613 28.881
205 Praha 5.903 2.304 8.378 28.817
42 Bruxelles 4.861 2.29 1.586 28.446
5 Amsterdam 4.514 2.29 1.099 28.032
94 Frankfurt 4.167 2.291 1.098 27.411
214 Rotterdam 4.167 2.289 2.435 26.077
288 Zu¨rich 4.167 2.292 2.413 22.689
129 Ko¨ln 3.472 2.282 1.015 22.237
44 Budapest 7.986 2.288 8.183 20.883
178 Mu¨nchen 4.167 2.291 3.103 20.063
82 Du¨sseldorf 2.778 2.278 0.074 19.722
172 Milano 4.514 2.285 2.807 17.978
16 Basel 3.819 2.282 2.696 16.885
276 Warschau 3.472 2.284 2.447 14.671
243 Strasbourg 3.125 2.27 0.674 13.958
96 Fredericia 3.125 2.283 5.032 12.938
138 Leipzig 2.083 2.278 0.598 12.741
108 Gravenhage 1.736 2.281 0.194 11.898
25 Bern 1.736 2.277 1.307 11.838
218 Saarbru¨cken 2.431 2.269 0.443 11.615
137 Le Havre 2.083 2.273 3.07 11.338
73 Danzig 5.208 2.276 4.883 10.713
134 Kristiania 2.431 2.272 0.227 10.077
265 Trieste 3.472 2.274 2.805 10.012
Source: Carte Schematique des Grandes Communications Te´le´graphiques Internationales du Re´gime
Europe´en dresse´e par le Bureau International de l’Union Te´le´graphique, ITU Library and Archives,
Geneva, 1 December 1923.
Software: Ucinet 6 for Windows
Remarks: Data is symmetric and has been binarized for all calculations including normalized Freeman degree.
The place names in the table resemble the language and spelling used in the original map.
40 Phillip Bonacich, ‘Factoring and weighting approaches to status scores and clique identification’, Journal
of Mathematical Sociology, 2, 1972, pp. 113–20.
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Therefore, the eigenvector ranking differs essentially from the betweenness table (at least
below the top ranks) and generally supports the findings of the domestic telegraphy analysis
above. Antwerp, Brussels and Amsterdam are excellent examples for this difference. As
Table 8 shows, these three cities feature normalized eigenvector values of between 30%
and 28%. They are therefore in the range of Hamburg or Prague and even relatively close
to Vienna, while their normalized betweenness values are marginal compared to those of
their competitors.
As to their position in the European telegraph network, this means that they were not
central in terms of being situated on the main routes of communication. They were of
only limited importance for the actual flow of information between other network nodes,
but had good access to the very centres of the network. Therefore it seems reasonable to
assume that these cities on the Belgian and Dutch coast and in the Swiss Alps occupied a
special position in the European (and global) communication network of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century. They did not belong to the leading metropoles nor were they
near the European average. It could be suggested that these cities were probably more on
the consuming end of the international dataflow, contributing less than they were receiving
and with little control over the flow of information itself.
Conclusion
It has been the main aim of this brief study primarily to provide clues as to where we can
find communication centres and peripheries in the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century world – both from a perspective of internal (or domestic) telegraphic development
as well as regarding their international connectivity. As has been pointed out earlier, a crude
distinction between the opposing ends of the spectrum is rather easy to establish. It was
predictable that the big metropolises of the day – such as London, Berlin and Paris – stood
at the very centre of national and international communication networks which reached out
across the entire globe. Similarly, it comes as little surprise that the few evaluated non-
European territories, the vast Asian part of Russia, or the poorer countries in the eastern
part of Europe had only rudimentary domestic networks and formed the end of the field
– let alone all the many states and colonies that would not even make it into the statistics.
This general pattern is rather well established, yet it offers us few clues as to the actual
transformative potential of telecommunications. The two ends of the spectrum are – in
the true sense of the phrase – worlds apart. They are essentially different in many social,
economic and cultural aspects and thus lack a common basis of comparison. So many other
factors would influence such a comparison that the accurate evaluation of the impact of
domestic and international connectivity could hardly be isolated in the process.
Therefore a more accurate and graded evaluation of the internal and external tele-
communication integration of a country or node is necessary in order to identify suitable
pairs for comparison. A first step in this direction has been made by looking at the statistical
data compiled by the Bureau International des Administrations Te´le´graphiques. In order to
render the results comparable the raw data had to be put in relation to the area and popula-
tion of the countries. The analysis of the different degrees of domestic telegraphic develop-
ment in different world regions between 1870 and 1900 has clearly shown that Europe
370 j
j
R O L A N D W E N Z L H U E M E R
featured the best-integrated telecommunication networks at that time. While it is absolutely
reasonable to assume that the United States was roughly on a par with the better-developed
European states, the data derived from ITU sources gives only limited clues to this. The
validity of the available figures is distorted by the vastness of the country and the unequal
distribution of the telegraph network in the United States. The very same holds true for
data on Russia. Non-Western regions generally lag far behind in telegraphic connectivity
throughout the period of observation. It is notable that white settler colonies such as New
Zealand or Victoria, as well as rapidly industrializing Meiji Japan, featured much better
development indicators than most colonies of domination that exhibited only rudimentary
telecommunication networks centred around the principal ports and economic regions.
In Europe, Great Britain, France and Germany (in various constellations until 1871)
obviously belong to the top group in terms of domestic telegraphic development. However,
they are joined – and even surpassed in certain categories – by compact, trade-oriented coun-
tries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Austria-Hungary (later only Austria)
and Italy together with the smaller Denmark form the telecommunications midfield, while the
rest of Scandinavia, the Iberian countries and most of Eastern Europe lag far behind and form
the bottom end of the European scale. The only ones doing worse are the various non-
European countries or colonies and obviously Russia, whose data is distorted by the vastness
of its landmass.
Trying to identify international communication centres (in our case within a European
network), the Social Network Analysis brought roughly corresponding results. In all cate-
gories, London, Paris and Berlin were topping the tables. However, Vienna – the capital
city of domestically only average Austria – ranks fourth in all feasible SNA categories. While
the internal telegraphic development in Austria could not compete with the top group, the
capital certainly occupied a central position in the European telegraph network. An equally
interesting observation has been made regarding the smaller members of the domestic top
group. Several Belgian, Dutch and Swiss cities occupy top ranks in degree centrality and
eigenvector centrality, yet they lag behind in betweenness centrality. At the moment, we
can only speculate as to what this position, close to the centres but far from the pathways
of information, meant for the development of these cities and their home countries. Only
a systematic comparison between these nodes and the European metropoles will shed
further light on the matter. Mainly corresponding with the findings of the domestic statis-
tics, the Social Network Analysis identified most Eastern European, Scandinavian (apart
from Denmark) and Iberian nodes as disadvantageously placed in the European network.
The poor performance of the Iberian countries in the domestic as well as in the international
evaluations is somewhat surprising. Both Portugal and Spain have longstanding maritime
traditions and have maintained considerable extra-European trade links. They also occupied
a central geographic position between Europe and Africa and guarded the entrance to the
Mediterranean. Admittedly, their economic and political influence had declined consider-
ably during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but Spain’s position, in particular, at
the very end of the European scale, nevertheless surprises.
Now, what have we gained through these analyses and what remains to be done? The
material presented in this study can at best provide a first step towards identifying global
communication centres and peripheries. While the preparation and indexing of the ITU
data has created a first, tentative map of domestic telegraphic development in Europe,
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much remains to be done here. Only the systematic consultation of the material left behind
by the national telegraph administrations can render such a map accurate and comprehen-
sive. Especially from the perspective of the global historian, the geographic focus on ITU
member states and the eurocentrism that follows from this must be utterly unsatisfactory.
Again, only the compilation and preparation of national telegraphic data will eventually
enable us to extend such a map beyond European borders. In addition, the data presented
in this part of the study is mainly static data on telegraph lines and wires. In the earlier study
mentioned above I have also included figures on telegraph bureaus and messages handled,41
but the potential insights provided by the latter category as to patterns of information flow
suffer particularly from the crudeness of the data. A refinement of our research methods and
access to more detailed statistical material will be crucial for future studies. In the case of
Great Britain, for instance, the telegraph administration has at various points in time gath-
ered information on the number and type of messages sent from and received at all major
telegraph bureaus. The analysis of such data is a painstaking process but will hopefully
soon provide us with fresh hints as to the pattern of information flow in Britain.
At least to my knowledge, the methods of Social Network Analysis have never been used
to examine the history of telecommunication in Europe before. As we have seen, these meth-
ods offer many useful hints as to the exact position and function of individual cities or
regions within the network. Particularly when contrasted with the findings of the domestic
telegraph study, a good number of new, sometimes surprising insights have been generated
and will hopefully inform future comparative studies on the topic. Yet, the potential of
Social Network Analysis for our specific purposes is severely curtailed by the scarcity of
available data. Maps or tables showing comprehensive data on national or international tel-
egraph circuits are extremely rare. When available at all, they tend to be incomplete – a par-
ticular problem for the analysis of an entity (the network) that unfolds its total potential
only on the global scale. The SNA conducted in this study illustrates these difficulties.
Instead of consulting data from the nineteenth century – which would have much better
complemented the findings of the first study – a map from the year 1923 builds the data-
base. And instead of dealing with a global network, we had to settle for the analysis of its
European part. Although the provision of a more comprehensive database for such studies
will be a laborious and piecemeal process, it should be one of the priorities of future studies
as it will hold the key for examining the prominence and power of any local node (and its
constituting agents) in the global network.
Roland Wenzlhuemer is a lecturer and researcher at the Centre for British Studies at
Humboldt-Universitaet in Berlin, Germany, and Honorary Research Fellow at
Birkbeck College, University of London.
41 Wenzlhuemer, ‘The development of telegraphy’.
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